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For over two-hundred years, the United States of America has personified itself as a 
world-wide protector of democracy and equality. Yet, at home, the United States has 
struggled to protect its own citizens’ basic democratic right -- the right to vote. The United 
States was founded on the concept that individuals should have a right to represent 
themselves in their own government; the right to vote awards citizens this power. 
Conversely, throughout history, both the federal and state governments have continually 
placed limitations on an individual’s right to vote. Each of these historic restrictions has 
continuously been challenged in an effort to protect the right to vote. Today, voters face a 
new type of restraint -- voter identification laws. Like the historic limitations placed on 
voting, the legality of voter identification laws has repeatedly been challenged in the nation’s 
courts. One such law that has been challenged is North Carolina’s voter identification law -- 
HB 589 / S.L. 2013-381. Since its passage in 2013, it has faced various lawsuits and has even 
made it onto the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States. An analysis of North 
Carolina’s voter identification law will provide insight into the motive(s) behind the passage 





Today, members of the electorate have erupted into mass demonstrations to protest 
the legality of voter identification laws. Protesters have compared today’s voter identification 
laws to those historically used by states to suppress voting. In order to understand and 
evaluate the controversy surrounding the legality of voter identification laws, it is important 
to first understand the history of voter suppression and how it compares to voter 
identification laws utilized by state and local governments today. 
Historically, states have held a considerable amount of power in determining the rules 
and guidelines of elections, both state and federal, within their borders. Today, states still 
hold this power, maybe even more so than the first national election in 1789. Thus, states 
across the country have continuously modified their elections, declaring it to the benefit of 
the state’s government and its citizens, all the while keeping in line with state and federal 
election guidelines. Even though this appears to be a legitimate power held by the states, it 
has previously been used as a way to justify voter suppression efforts. Used to keep less 
desirable populations from voting, voting suppression efforts have been ingrained in the 
history of American elections ever since the first election almost 230 years ago. 
Since the first election in 1789, certain inhabitants of the United States have been 
barred from voting. In addition to property tests used by the colonists to limit less wealthy, 
non-land owning males from voting, other members of the population were disenfranchised 
based solely on their gender or the color of their skin (Williamson, 1960). During the 18th 
century, in addition to non-propertied white males, the disenfranchised populace included 
African Americans, Native Americans, and women. By 1790, only around 60 to 70 percent 
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of adult white males were eligible to vote (Keyssar, 2009). Despite claiming to be an equal 
and democratic nation, the majority of America’s inhabitants were not allowed to vote.  
 Slowly, over the next few decades, suffrage was extended to white males who did not 
own property. Previously thought to be dangerous, some individuals were coming around to 
the idea that extending suffrage to larger numbers of the population would lead to more 
democratic representation. In 1818, in a Connecticut newspaper titled the Times, a reporter 
declared that, when a large portion of people are deprived from voting, the basic principle of 
democracy has been destroyed (Free, 2015). By 1855, 17 of the then 31 states had eliminated 
the possession of property as a requirement for voting (Free, 2015).  
By the end of the 1850s, there had been a dramatic decline in the property 
requirements to vote; this resulted in a broadening of the American electorate. By the end of 
the decade, only two states still required some form of property requirements for their 
electorate, applying to foreign born residents of Rhode Island and to free African-American 
residents of North Carolina (Keyssar, 2009). Furthermore, there were other individuals 
within the electorate who retained the right to vote, but were stripped of this right due to their 
behavior. This most commonly included felons and those jailed for being paupers (Keyssar, 
2009). In addition to felons and paupers, the recent influx of immigrants resulted in a sea of 
voter restrictions attempting to disenfranchise those who were not Protestant white males. In 
1845, the American Review published an argument that condemned allowing foreigners to 
vote in an attempt to maintain racial homogeneity (Williamson, 1960). 
 By 1861, the Civil War was in full swing, along with questions regarding the possible 
enfranchisement of black males. As a result of the 1857 Supreme Court decision, Dred Scott 
v. Sanford, black individuals who were descendants of those imported to the United States 
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and sold as slaves were not legally considered American citizens. If this case remained law, 
then it would be impossible to award the right to vote to an entire population of individuals 
who were not even considered American citizens. By the end of 1865, the Civil War was 
over and Congress had formulated a solution to the Dred Scott decision, eight years prior. In 
order to address this issue, Congress passed the 13th Amendment outlawing slavery and the 
14th Amendment three years later awarding citizenship to former slaves. Now that slavery 
was outlawed and African-Americans considered citizens under the Constitution, African -
Americans were then able to claim the right to vote, which they were then awarded by the 
15th Amendment.  However, this was only extended to black males.  
 After the ratification of the 15th Amendment in 1870, the American electorate was on 
a path towards universal suffrage. The black vote began to rise in former Confederate states, 
including Mississippi, which had a higher population of black voters than white (Waldman, 
2016). Throughout Reconstruction, the electorate in former Confederate states elected 
between 264 and 324 black representatives to office (Waldman, 2016). Regrettably, this still 
only accounted for one out of every six lawmakers from the South. Still, black suffrage in the 
South continued to thrive. By 1877, the Compromise of 1877 had brought an end to 
Reconstruction. Now that Rutherford B. Hayes was in the White House, the federal 
government withdrew their military forces from the South. Surprisingly, despite the 
withdrawal of federal troops, two-thirds of black men continued to vote in the former 
Confederate states with little to no problems (Waldman 2016). 
 Nevertheless, three years later in 1890, southern Democrats saw a threat in black 
voters as the economy dove into a depression (Waldman, 2016). Now that the Northern 
troops had withdrawn from the South, former Confederate states began to exercise further 
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control over their elections. Southern Democratic Party leaders recognized that the power to 
carry out elections still remained with the independent jurisdictions of each state. Since this 
power remained with the states, former Confederate and some northern states, which did not 
allow blacks to vote prior to the ratification of the 15th Amendment, now had the power to 
suppress, if not eliminate, the black vote, while keeping in line with the 15th Amendment. 
Following Reconstruction, former Confederate states took the opportunity to begin 
introducing different variations of voter suppression efforts that bypassed the 15th 
Amendment using Jim Crow laws. Common methods of voter suppression included poll 
taxes, grandfather clauses, and literacy tests. 
 Under a Republican controlled Congress, representatives wrote the 15th Amendment 
so that no individual could be banned from voting based solely on their race; however, the 
newly instituted Jim Crow laws did not ban eligible residents who could vote based solely on 
their race; rather, the new laws restricted other aspects of a residents’ character, aspects 
which were more likely to disenfranchise black and not white voters (Ewald, 2009).  To 
“purify the electorate,” states implemented two types of legal restrictions (Keyssar, 2009, p. 
103). First, states prescribed certain qualifications potential voters had to meet before they 
could register. Second, the state would enforce procedures members of the electorate had to 
follow in order to retain their right to vote. 
These efforts began when Mississippi convened a constitutional convention to draw 
up a new constitution that would allow them to circumvent the Civil War Amendments, 
particularly the 15th (Porter, 1971). If Mississippi officials found a way to circumvent the 15th 
Amendment, they would legally have a method to disenfranchise black voters. Mississippi 
began this practice by implementing literacy tests, which gave voting officials the discretion 
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to prohibit voters who were deemed “insufficiently educated” (Waldman, 2016, p. 84). 
Remarkably, the earliest adoption of literacy tests occurred in Massachusetts and Connecticut 
in the 1850s (Keyssar, 2009). Yet, in these cases, literacy tests were an attempt to 
disenfranchise potential non-English speaking immigrants from voting. Eventually, the use of 
this form of literacy test died out by the 1870s. 
In 1898, Mississippi’s literacy tests were challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Mississippi. The ruling in the case held that Mississippi’s literacy test did not 
violate the 15th Amendment because they were not facially racially discriminatory towards 
black voters (Ewald, 2009). As a result of the Williams ruling, other former Confederate 
states, and some Northern states, implemented literacy tests so they could curtail the black 
populations within their states from voting. In 1899, North Carolina amended its constitution 
to include an educational test that required potential voters to be able to read and write any 
section of the state or federal constitution in English (Porter, 1971). 
The implementation of literacy tests was found to be exceedingly effective in 
restricting the black vote throughout the South. At this time, 50 percent of black men were 
illiterate, compared to only 15 percent of white men (Keyssar, 2009). This severely restricted 
the power of blacks to register enough voters to elect black representatives, resulting in 
sweeping representative turnovers in Southern states. Literacy tests persevered through the 
20th century in the case Giles v. Harris (1903), when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to help 
a black man who was denied his right to vote by local election officials (Ewald, 2009). The 
use of literacy tests continued well through the middle of the 20th century in a majority of 
Southern states.  
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In 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights examined the content of literacy tests 
still used in the South. A literacy test administered in Selma in 1965 included the questions, 
“At what time of day on the 20th of January each four years does the term of the President of 
the United States end?” and “If the President does not wish to sign a bill, how many days is 
he allowed in which to return it to Congress for reconsideration?” (Waldman, 2016). On the 
other hand, literacy tests in Louisiana asked potential registers to answer 30 illogical 
questions within the span of 10 minutes without making a single mistake (Waldman, 2016). 
Yet, the most common form of literacy tests administered required potential registers to 
recite a particular section(s) of their state and/or federal constitution, similar to North 
Carolina’s test (Wang, 2012).  
Despite the promise that no voter would be barred from voting based on race, literacy 
tests continued to discriminate against blacks who attempted to register. Finally, 100 years 
after the end of the Civil War, blacks and other minority voters were guaranteed that they 
would not be denied the right to vote “by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (U.S. Const. amend. 15) due to the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thanks to this act, states could no longer administer literacy 
tests to any individuals who wished to register to vote. This suspension of literacy tests 
across the nation led to number of black voters in the South increasing from 31 to 73 percent 
of black eligible voters (Berman, 2016).  
In addition to literacy tests, local voting districts also implemented secret-ballot laws 
as an attempt to further restrict voting by illiterate members of the electorate. First referred to 
as an “Australian ballot,” secret ballots were intended to protect the privacy of the electorate 
when voting. Secret-ballots were ballots printed with list of candidates’ names that voters 
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could fill out in private without any influence from election officials (Waldman, 2016). The 
implementation of secret ballots required illiterate members of the electorate to choose their 
candidates without any form of aid to read the ballot. This intentionally resulted in electors 
choosing candidates they did not intend and scores of ballots filled out incorrectly, making 
them invalid (Wang, 2012).  Today, voters still use the secret ballot method when voting for 
candidates. Unlike 100 years ago, most of the American electorate is literate; still, there are 
those among the electorate today who are illiterate, but unlike a century ago these voters are 
offered help when casting their ballot. 
Sadly, former Confederate states did not just stop at literacy tests to bar blacks from 
voting. Like literacy tests, Southern states also wrote in grandfather clauses into their new 
constitutions following Reconstruction. In addition to the suppression of black voters, 
grandfather clauses also disenfranchised large populations of immigrant voters. Grandfather 
clauses required potential voters to show that, if they or their ancestors had voted in the 1860 
election, then they were exempt from literacy tests, poll taxes, or property requirements 
(Keyssar, 2009). The first grandfather clause was implemented by South Carolina in 1890 
and had a striking resemblance to a similar anti-immigrant law passed in 1857 in 
Massachusetts (Keyssar, 2009).  
Following suit, in 1899, North Carolina amended its 1876 constitution to include a 
grandfather clause that said, prior to 1909, individuals who could vote in the 1867 election, 
or were the descendant of someone who could, would not have to satisfy their recently 
implemented educational test (Porter, 1971). In 1915, in one of their earliest lawsuits, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged an 
Oklahoma grandfather clause that required potential voters to prove they were a descendant 
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of someone who voted in the 1865 election if they wanted to avoid taking a literacy test 
(Waldman, 2016). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Guinn v. United States, that Oklahoma’s 
law did indeed violate provisions of the 15th Amendment by trying to manipulate its 
intentional meaning (Waldman, 2016).    
In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a similar ruling outlawing the use of white 
primaries by state election districts (Keyssar, 2009). First used in the early 1890s by 
Democratic party members in former Confederate states, white primaries excluded blacks 
from participating in pre-elections (Marshall, 1957). By not allowing black voters to 
participate in primaries, whites had the sole power of choosing candidates who would be on 
the ballot. This gave whites the opportunity to cherry pick candidates they felt would be more 
sympathetic to white issues. Despite the fact some blacks could vote, their votes would not 
have mattered if they did not have the opportunity to vote for candidates who would 
represent them as members of their constituency. Before joining the Supreme Court, then 
civil rights attorney, Thurgood Marshall (1957), asserted white primaries were the most 
effective methods used by the Democratic South to disenfranchise black and other minority 
voters.  
Moreover, another method used by former Confederate states to disenfranchise voters 
was the requirement of voters to pay poll taxes before they could cast their ballot. Mississippi 
was the first state to amended its constitution in 1890, with seven other states following suit 
over the next 18 years (Waldman, 2016). At first, a poll tax was understood to be a head tax 
that everyone had to pay, which could also sometimes go towards a taxpaying requirement to 
vote. However, its original intention was shifted to mean a tax someone had to pay if they 
wanted to vote (Keyssar, 2009).  
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Registered voters who wished to vote were required to pay fees to the voting 
jurisdiction, typically at the county level, ahead of an election in order to cast their ballot 
(Wang 2012). This proved particularly difficult for members of the electorate who did not 
have their own forms of transportation or relied on public transportation to reach the county 
office to pay their fees. This requirement was also problematic for voters who could not leave 
their jobs during business hours, thus requiring them to take pay cuts to pay an additional fee 
to vote. Those who did not have their fees paid before the election or had a back list of taxes 
they had not yet paid would be deemed ineligible to vote. By 1954, only five states using poll 
taxes remained: Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia (Keyssar, 2009). 
Voters in these states were subjected to economic hurdles, such as government officials not 
sending tax bills to blacks and not giving blacks their receipts when their taxes are paid, 
making it impossible for them to prove their poll taxes had been paid (Keyssar, 2009).  
Fortunately, 12 years later, Congress passed the 24th Amendment, making the 
requirement of poll taxes in federal elections illegal. Regrettably, this decision only applied 
to the use of poll taxes in federal elections, not state elections. States could still require voters 
to pay polls taxes if they wished to vote in state and local elections. Still, Senator Edward 
Kennedy (D-Mass.) continued to fight for an amendment that would outlaw poll taxes in 
state elections (Waldman, 2016). Kennedy got his wish in 1966 when the Supreme Court 
decided Harper v. Board of Virginia and outlawed the use of poll taxes in state elections, 
holding that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (Keyssar, 2009). 
On the other hand, voters today have made comparisons between the historic use of poll 
taxes and the current requirement by states for voters to present a valid form of identification 
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before they can cast their ballot. These laws require voters to pay a fee before they can obtain 
an acceptable form of identification needed to vote, just like poll taxes. 
The following chapters will continue the discussion of history of voter suppression 
and its relationship with the recent implementation of voter identification laws by state 
governments. Chapter Two will examine the implementation of recent voter identification 
laws throughout the country, with a focus on how these laws affect voting and the electorate 
within each state and the country. Chapter Three will cover North Carolina’s voter 
identification laws and how they affect North Carolina’s electorate.  This will entail looking 
into the history of North Carolina’s voter identification laws, including when they were 
enacted, gauging the possible differences between elections with and without North 
Carolina’s voter identification laws, to see how they affect different variables, such as 
electoral turnout. 
Chapter Four will inspect the recent challenges to North Carolina’s voter 
identification laws. This includes how the electorate has responded to the implementation of 
these voter identification laws and the legal suits brought against states challenging their 
constitutionality. Chapter Five will analyze the unanimous decision regarding the 
constitutionality of North Carolina’s voter identification laws, issued by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 4th Circuit. Implications of this decision will be discussed, including how 
this decision affects the future of voter identification laws in the state and the country for 
future elections. 
Voter suppression laws are an issue that has dominated both state and federal 
elections since the first election in 1789. They have survived by taking on different forms 
throughout America’s history. Today, they are present in the practice of requiring voters to 
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present a valid form of identification, depending on each state, prior to voting. Like previous 
voter identification laws, the voter identification laws of today have been both supported and 
challenged by different members of state legislatures, the federal government, and the 
electorate. The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to hear a case regarding the constitutionality of 
these laws, however, some identification laws, like North Carolina’s, have been challenged in 
lower federal district courts. From these decisions, the future of voting identification laws 




For the past seventeen years, states throughout the country have rapidly implemented 
voter ID laws. Nevertheless, in 1950, South Carolina enforced the country’s first form of ID 
law when it required voters to show a form of identification. Unlike most voter ID laws 
today, South Carolina did not require voters to show a photo to prove identification; instead, 
voters were asked to provide a document showing the voter’s name (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2016). Nonetheless, there are still a few states today who only request a 
document displaying a voter’s name, instead of requiring voters to show a photo before 
voting.   
It was not until 1970 that Hawaii became the second state to implement its own voter 
ID law. Texas, Florida and Alaska followed suit within the next 10 years by implementing 
their own versions of voter ID laws. By 2000, voter ID laws were beginning to gain 
controversial attention as a total of 14 states had come to adopt similar voter ID laws. Since 
2000, other states rapidly began to enact voter ID laws since the passage of the Help 
Americans Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 (Alvarez et. al., 2008). The passage of HAVA resulted 
in the formation of the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC). This new 
commission was awarded $3 billion in federal funding to go towards election administration 
(Montjoy, 2010). This commission was the first of its kind to receive federal funding for an 
election administration. (Montjoy, 2010). The passage of HAVA required significant changes 
to be made to how voters registered throughout the United States. In addition to voter 
registration, HAVA also altered states’ use of voting technology and polling place 
operations.  
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Yet, the largest issue that stemmed from the passage of HAVA was Section 303, 
which required all new registrants to provide or show a proof of identification either with 
their mail application or when the first time they turned up to vote (Alvarez et. al., 2008). 
Section 303’s impact on the creation and/or altercation of state voting ID laws led to the 
rapid implementation of such laws by states since 2002. It began when Missouri enacted non-
photo ID requirements in 2002, followed by four other states adopting a similar law and 
South Dakota requiring a photo ID in 2003. By May of 2016, there had been 33 additional 
occurrences of states either adopting new voter ID laws or amending ones their states already 
had in place (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2016). 
The extent of voter ID laws varies depending on each state. The extent of voter ID 
laws is typically measured by labeling them as either strict or non-strict. There is also an 
additional label applied depending on whether or not a state requires a photo before voting. 
The least restrictive form of voter ID law is a non-strict, no-photo ID law. These 
requirements for these laws typically vary from state to state. For example, in Arkansas, an 
election official can waive the identification requirement if he/she knows the voter. In 
Delaware, electors are asked to sign an affidavit of affirmation saying they are the person 
listed to vote and, in Hawaii, voters who do not have an acceptable form of identification are 
asked to recite their place of residence and date of birth (Underhill, 2016). Currently, 14 
states have non-strict, non-photo ID laws in place (Underhill, 2016) 
The second level of severity is non-strict photo ID laws. These laws require voters to 
show an acceptable form of photo identification, depending on the state, in order to vote. 
Still, if electors do not have an acceptable form of photo identification, they may be allowed 
to cast a provisional ballot or sign an affidavit of affirmation. There are eight states that 
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presently use non-strict photo ID laws (Underhill, 2016). The next level of severity includes 
strict, non-photo ID laws. These laws request voters to produce a form of identification, like 
a power bill displaying the voter’s address or a birth certificate. They do not require electors 
to show a photo to vote. If electors are not able to provide an acceptable form of 
identification, they may either be allowed to cast a provisional ballot or sign an affidavit of 
affirmation, depending on the state. There are currently three states whose elections operate 
under strict, non-photo voter ID laws.  
The most extensive voter ID laws are strict photo ID laws. Presently, there are seven 
states that have implemented strict photo ID laws (Underhill, 2016). Similar to non-strict 
photo ID laws, strict photo-ID laws allow electors who do not have an acceptable form of 
photo ID to cast a provisional ballot or sign an affidavit of affirmation. Unlike non-strict 
photo ID laws, voters who cast provisional ballots or sign affidavit of affirmation in these 
states must bring a valid photo ID to an official state office, determined by each state, like a 
county registrar’s office, within a certain time-period after the election, also determined by 
each state, if they want their ballot to be counted. 
The effect of these voter ID laws, like their extent, varies from state to state. Still, 
there are common patterns that show that, no matter the extent of a state’s voter ID law, all 
voter ID laws impact the electorate not just of a single state, but the electorate of the entire 
country. Without the implementation of voter ID laws, voters are already deterred from 
voting due to their socio-demographic factors and their declining political motivation to vote 
(Sobel & Smith, 2009). In addition to these factors, the inclusion of a voter ID laws can 
further deter the eligible voting population from voting.  
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 ID laws have the power to disproportionally affect the poor because of the need to use 
a government issued ID. Those classified as poor voters often do not have the means to own 
cars or travel by air (Sobel & Smith, 2009). Their inability to use these methods of 
transportation causes them to not need either a driver’s license or passport, both of which can 
be used to satisfy voter ID laws. Poor voters who are homeless, live with relatives, or move 
often from place to place may not have the proof of address needed to satisfy voter ID 
requirements (Sobel & Smith, 2009). Elderly voters may also face extreme difficulty, no 
matter their socioeconomic status, because of the distances they may have to travel to obtain 
an acceptable form of identification (Sobel & Smith, 2009).  
In addition to the poor and elderly, there are several other groups of people, such as 
minorities and students, who encounter trouble when obtaining an acceptable form of 
identification. In regards to minorities, around twenty-five-percent of registered African-
Americans do not have a proper photo ID needed to vote, compared to only eight-percent of 
white voters (ACLU, 2016). In North Carolina, the elimination of teenage pre-registration 
and the rejection of university issued student photo-IDs further attempt to disenfranchise 
young voters (Foley, 2016). Younger voters’ face a difficulty to effectively grasp the new 
concept of voting during their first election, this makes it indirectly difficult for young voters 
to properly cast their ballots, especially when election rules are changing frequently and 
drastically (Turner, 2015).   
 Despite the possibility that voter ID laws negatively affect some populations of the 
electorate more than others, there has been little research done on the effects of voter ID 
laws. Most of the studies that have attempted to address this issue have isolated their 
experiments to just one or a few states. This could be because of the discrepancy of voter ID 
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laws between states. In a 2006 study monitoring the effect of voter ID laws in New Mexico, 
political scientists found that, despite the numerous ways voters could prove their identity, 
New Mexico’s voter ID law was disproportionally implemented in polling places throughout 
the states (Alvarez et. al., 2008).  
In New Mexico, polling officials were expected to implement their state’s voter ID 
law equally. In reality, polling officials were given a large amount of discretion, which 
resulted in some polling officials applying the voter ID laws unevenly among voters in 
different voting districts (Alvarez et. al., 2008).  Not having a uniform system of 
implementation increases the chance that some voters, depending on their voting district, will 
experience discrimination at the polls. The improper education and training of polling place 
workers who are expected to enforce voter ID laws could counter the purpose of the laws by 
giving some voters unfair advantages over others.  
 In a separate study, Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez (2007) analyzed the effect of voter 
ID laws on immigrant and minority voters in Washington, New Mexico, and California. 
Their results found that, out of the six types of identification they sampled, Latinos, Asians, 
Blacks, and immigrants were statistically less likely to have access to five out of the six types 
of IDs they surveyed (Barreto, Nuno, & Sanchez, 2007). They also found that social class 
and voters’ level of education was a factor when determining how many acceptable forms of 
identification they had out of the six surveyed.  Voters in a higher social class and with 
higher levels of education were more likely to have five of the six types of valid ID (Barreto, 
Nuno, & Sanchez, 2007). This suggests that voters in higher social classes, who also have 
higher levels of education, have an advantage over voters in lower social classes with lower 
levels of education when it comes to voting in states with ID laws.  
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 In addition to social class, race, and education level, a voter’s age also plays a large 
part in determining access to the polls in states with voter ID laws. Since its ratification in 
1971, the 26th Amendment has granted citizens eighteen and above the right to vote in both 
state and federal elections. Prior to its ratification, only citizens over the age of twenty-one 
could vote. Unfortunately, the recent implementation of voter ID laws have been shown to 
counter this progress by disproportionally impacting college-age voters. For example, in 
2011 Kansas strengthened their voter ID law by requiring voters to provide proof of 
citizenship when registering and an approved photo ID when voting (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2016). As a result of this change, voter turnout among eighteen year olds 
fell 7.1 percent more than voters between the ages of forty-four and fifty-three, since younger 
voters were less likely to have an ID accepted under Kansas new voter ID law (Foley, 2016). 
 One way states may impact the registration of college-age voters is requiring voters to 
present a ID at their polling place, but not accepting student-issued IDs. In Texas, a minority 
student filled a suit against the state after they excluded the use of student IDs as an 
acceptable form of identification in the case Veasey v. Perry (2014) (Foley, 2016). At the 
time, 25 percent of Black students in Texas did not have an acceptable government-issued ID 
needed to vote in Texas (Foley, 2016). The Texas League of Young Voters joined the 
students on the suit and claimed that the Texas voter ID laws violated Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, as well as the 1st, 14th, 15th, and 21st Amendments (Foley, 2016).  Ultimately, the 
district court ruled that Texas voter ID law did disproportionally impact African-American 
and Hispanic voters and created a burden on this population of voters. Sadly, this is just one 
case of voter disenfranchisement among college-age students.  
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In addition to younger voter populations being affected by voter ID laws, studies have 
also shown that older voters are less likely to have the proper form of identification needed to 
vote. Like college students, certain segments of the senior population are limited in their 
ability to access the proper transportation needed to reach government facilities that issue 
accepted forms of identification. Furthermore, seniors may be constrained by their health 
while trying to complete the process of obtaining their ID. Simple tasks like driving and 
waiting in line disproportionally impact the elderly over other, able populations. A study 
conducted by a team political scientists found evidence of Indiana’s voter ID law 
disproportionally impacting different age groups. This team of political scientists found that 
Indiana’s voter ID law impact voter on a curvilinear pattern (Barreto, Nuno, &Sanchez, 
2009). This means that voters on the opposite sides of the study, being the youngest and 
oldest, were less likely to have the proper form of identification needed to vote in Indiana. 
Sadly, the same issues that impair seniors from obtaining IDs could also impact the ability of 
disabled voters as well.   
As the number of voter ID laws continued to grow, the litigation rate challenging 
them grew as well. Over half of the states that have enacted voter ID laws have seen at least 
one legal challenge, while some state have seen three or four (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2014). The most common arguments used to challenge voter ID laws are equal 
protection, poll tax, discriminatory intent/effects, right to vote, and unlawful additional 
qualification. The most significant challenge to arguments of equal protection was in January 
of 2008 in the Supreme Court Case Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. The 
petitioner, William Crawford, argued that a 2005 law passed by the Indiana Legislature and 
enforced by the Marion County Election Board placed an undue burden on citizens’ right to 
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vote (Barreto, Nuno, & Sanchez, 2009). This 2005 law required voters to present either a 
valid state or federal photo identification before voters could cast their ballot.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that Indiana’s law did not create an undue 
burden on voters; rather, the law served a legitimate state interest by attempting to prevent 
voter fraud in the state of Indiana (Mycoff et. al., 2009). In response to this ruling, there have 
been countless studies examining whether or not Indiana’s 2005 law is indeed discriminatory 
and creates an undue burden. In their study, Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez (2009) concluded 
that the Supreme Court’s majority decision relied on previous cases that had no bearing in 
this decision. Even though the Supreme Court recognized there were no cases of voter 
impersonation in Indiana, the fact that there were cases across the country justified Indiana’s 
legitimate state interest to pass their 2005 law (2009). On the other hand, Barreto, Nuno, and 
Sanchez (2009) concluded that cases of voter impersonation were so rare that they in no way 
outweighed the burden placed on Indiana’s voters over the state of Indiana’s right to protect a 
legitimate state interest. 
Since the Crawford decision, both federal appellate and state courts have continued to 
apply the balancing test used in Crawford for other equal protection cases. like Common 
Cause v. Billups (2009) and Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue (2011), both which were 
ruled in the state of Georgia’s favor, asserting Georgia’s right to protect the state’s interest to 
prevent voter impersonation. Despite the fact the Supreme Court ruled that laws, such as the 
one in Indiana, did not create an undue burden, there have been dozens more cases 
challenging similar state laws on different grounds. Unlike the unsuccessful attempt in 
Indiana, there have been some cases that have supported the unconstitutionality of voter ID 
laws. Six years before Democratic Party of Georgia v. Perdue, a district court in the state of 
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Georgia accepted the argument that Georgia’s original voter ID law served as a poll tax by 
requiring Georgia’s electorate to pay a $20 fee for valid ID cards (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2014). Unlike the equal protection argument, the poll tax argument has 
seen more success, most likely due to the historic impact of poll taxes and the significance of 
the 24th Amendment.  
One argument that has faced problematic outcomes is the accusation of 
discriminatory intent and/or effects. Signed into law in 1965, Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act claimed that voting districts with a history of discrimination, defined within Section 4(b), 
are subject to preclearance from the Department of Justice before they could enact any law 
that would change their current approved election laws. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
allowed the Department of Justice to monitor historically discriminatory districts in an effort 
to promote the equal right of all citizens to vote, without fear of discriminatory tactics similar 
to those of poll taxes and literacy tests. For over 40 years, the Department of Justice 
continued to supervise the passage of new election laws in historically discriminatory 
districts; that is, until Section 5 was subject to renewal in 2006. After Section 5 was renewed 
by Congress for another 25 years, the renewal was challenged in Shelby County v. Holder 
(2011). 
Per Shelby County, the Court ruled that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was 
constitutional; however, the method in which districts were labeled discriminatory, under 
Section 4(b), was unconstitutional (570 U.S. (2013)). In the Court’s majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Roberts declared that the restrictions determined by Section 4 of the Voting Rights 
Act were no longer necessary to regulate state election laws (570 U.S. (2013)). As a result of 
this ruling, other states, like South Carolina, began to challenge their state’s election laws 
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that were previously denied preclearance under Section 5. Like Shelby County, South 
Carolina was granted their previously denied preclearance (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2014).  
Another argument used to challenge voter ID laws is the perception that voters have a 
right to vote granted to them by state constitutions, which is being violated through the use of 
voter ID laws. In addition to federal protections found in the Constitution, most state 
constitutions also have additional provisions protecting a citizen’s right to vote. Several state 
constitutions protect their citizens by assuring that election held within their state will remain 
free and open (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). The right to vote argument 
has since been successful in states that grant free elections, such as Arkansas, Missouri, and 
Pennsylvania. For example, in Pennsylvania, the state constitution claims that elections will 
remain free by denying an influence of power from civil or military interference (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). This protection was created to safeguard the 
suffrage of Pennsylvania’s citizens and the free exercise of voting.  Yet, this argument has 
also seen success in states that do not explicitly include a free elections clause in their state 
constitutions. In the state court decision, Milwaukee NAACP v. Walker (2012), the state of 
Wisconsin found that the voting criteria laid out in the state’s constitution equals the 
protection of a free elections clause, thereby defending an individual’s right to vote (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). 
National Conference of State Legislature’s final argument against state voter ID laws 
is unlawful additional qualification.  In addition to the already existing list of qualifications 
needed to vote, voter ID laws add an additional, unnecessary, and unlawful requirement to an 
individual’s right to vote (2014). Generally, this argument has been met with mixed results. 
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Lower state courts in Arkansas, Georgia, and Wisconsin acknowledge this argument; 
however, higher state courts Georgia and Wisconsin have rejected this argument and 
overturned the decisions of their lower courts (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2014).  Instead of being viewed as additional qualification, higher state courts see voter ID 
laws as “regulations on existing qualifications” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2014, 6). This implies that voter ID laws are not qualifications for voting, but a way to 
administer election laws states already have in place. This reasoning strengthens the power 
held by states, given to them through the 10th Amendment, to conduct their elections within 
their districts as they see fit.  
Noticeably, voter ID laws have been irregularly applied to states throughout the 
country. Thus, different populations of the electorate have been disproportionally affected by 
these voter ID laws depending on the state in which they vote. As of September, of 2016, 
only 16 states do not have voter ID laws in place (Underhill, 2016). Of the 34 states that do, 
14 enforce non-strict, no-photo ID laws, eight enforce non-strict photo ID laws, three enforce 
strict, non-photo ID laws, and seven states enforce strict photo ID laws, the most extensive 
type of photo ID law in place (Underhill, 2016).  
Yet, this still leaves two out of the 34 states uncounted for-- South Dakota and North 
Carolina. South Dakota, who is included in the 34 states, has passed a voter ID law, but it 
will not go into effect until 2018. On the other hand, North Carolina’s voter ID law, HB 589, 
has been struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit. The next chapter will 
explore in detail the text of North Carolina’s former voter ID law, including the history of 
voter ID laws in North Carolina, how HB 589 came to be put in place, and how HB 589 
specifically affected North Carolina’s electorate.  
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Chapter Three 
On July 25, 2013, the North Carolina House of Representatives voted to pass the HB 
589 / S.L. 2013-381, also known as the Voter Information Verification Act (VIVA), by a 
vote of 73-42. This vote occurred on deep party lines with all 73 ayes coming from the 
Republican party and all 42 nays from Democrats. The bill passed with the promise to restore 
confidence in government by protecting the integrity of North Carolina elections. Prior to its 
passage, state governments across the country voiced concern regarding a possible increase 
in voter fraud in elections throughout the country, including the Governor of North Carolina, 
Pat McCrory (Hawkins, 2015). The bill sought to curb these fears.  
Prior to the decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), North Carolina was required 
to receive approval from the Department of Justice for any change they intended to make to 
the state’s voting laws due to a provision in the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 (Herron 
and Smith, 2015). After the passage of the VRA, Section 5 of the act placed North Carolina 
into a category of states with historically discriminatory voting practices. All the states within 
Section 5, North Carolina included, were required to have pre-clearance from the Department 
of Justice before they could pass any new election and/or voting laws within their state.  
Instead, Shelby resulted in the Supreme Court invalidating section 4(b), which 
determined what voting districts needed to obtain preclearance before implementing any new 
voting provisions, of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 which in turn allowed the 
Department of Justice to enforce Section 5 of the VRA, prior to the decision in Shelby 
(Turner, 2015). Section 5 of the VRA allowed the Department of Justice to freeze the 
electoral practices of states which required pre-clearance, until their new electoral practices 
could be approved by the Attorney General or another member of the Department of Justice. 
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Once Section 4(b) was declared unconstitutional, the federal government could no longer 
freeze new electoral practices of states-which previously had to obtain preclearance under 
Section 5.  
That change meant that after the outcome of Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the 
North Carolina state legislature no longer needed approval from the Department of Justice to 
pass laws relating to voting. No longer needing permission from the Department of Justice, 
the North Carolina legislature began to fashion a new voter photo ID law and other drastic 
voter reforms the day after Shelby was decided (Turner, 2015). On July 23, 2016, the North 
Carolina Senate pushed forward with HB 589 / S.L. 2013-381, which had received no 
acknowledgment by either chamber for almost three months. Within 20 days, HB 589 was 
signed into law by then-Governor Pat McCrory. 
In addition to the enthusiastic response to the Shelby decision, it was put forth that 
HB 589 was also a product of increasing partisan politics within the North Carolina 
legislature, partisan politics that began three years earlier after the 2010 election. Following 
the 2010 mid-term election, North Carolina experienced a shift in party leadership, which 
resulted in Republicans gaining control of the House and Senate (Raymond, 2014). Unlike 
Democrats, Republicans tend to have more of an incentive to pass voter photo ID laws, 
especially in North Carolina. For Example, in North Carolina, Democrats make up 43 percent 
of registered voters; however, they also make up 55 percent of registered voters who do not 
have an acceptable form of ID under North Carolina law (Raymond, 2014). 
As a byproduct from the recent shift in power, the new Republican-controlled House 
and Senate introduced a new voter photo ID bill in 2011. Similar to HB 539, HB 351 
required voters to present a government issued photo ID for in-person voting (Raymond, 
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2014). Unlike HB 539, HB 351 chiefly focused on voter identification; it did not call for an 
overhaul of North Carolina’s traditional election procedures.  
By March 14, 2011, HB 351 had officially passed through both the House and the 
Senate. Like HB 589, HB 351 acquired all its votes of support from the Republican Party, 
with no Republican voting against the bill (Raymond, 2014). Unsurprisingly, all opposition 
to the bill arose from the Democratic Party. Identical to the vote for HB 589, no Democratic 
legislator voted to support the 2011 bill. By June 17, the bill had reached Democratic 
Governor Bev Perdue’s desk to be signed (Raymond, 2014). She, unlike Pat McCrory two 
years later, vetoed HB 351 (Raymond, 2014).  
After Perdue’s veto, the House was unable to garner enough votes to override the 
gubernatorial veto. The House’s inability to override Perdue’s veto left them with no other 
choice than to forfeit their plans for a voter photo ID law, at least until 2013. The 2013 
election of Republican Governor Pat McCrory, paired with the Shelby decision, provided the 
Republican-controlled legislature with the ammunition they needed to successfully pass a 
new and improved voter photo ID law, HB 589. Unlike HB 351, the North Carolina 
legislature recognized they now had the power to include additional election-altering 
provisions they did not attempt to include in HB 351. Instead of the six-page voter photo ID 
law introduced in 2011, in 2013, the House introduced HB 589, a fifty-seven-page document 
announcing an almost entirely new method for carrying out elections in North Carolina.  
The extent of the new North Carolina voter ID law, put in place through the passage 
of HB 589, met the requirements of a strict photo ID law, the most extensive form of voter 
identification law states could employ. Within the text of the bill, HB 589 laid out extensive 
election reform, which resulted in an entirely new approach to voting unseen in any North 
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Carolina election districts prior to 2013. Beginning in January 2014, poll officials were 
allowed to ask voters for a photo ID; however, voters were not obligated to provide one. Yet, 
by January of 2016, poll officials were expected to ask voters for a photo ID and voters were 
required to present one so long as it meet the requirements of a photo ID in HB 589.  
Per HB 589, acceptable forms of photo ID included: North Carolina driver’s 
license/learner’s permit/provisional license; a special form of North Carolina ID for non-
drivers; US passport, military/veterans ID; US or North Carolina enrollment card from a 
recognized tribe; or an out-of-state driver’s license valid for 90 days after the voter registered 
in North Carolina. The only exceptions to the photo ID requirements above included voters 
who have religious objection to having their photo taken and voters who use curbside voting; 
however, curbside voters were still required to present some form of identification, such as a 
utility bill or government document with their name and current address. Even mail-in 
absentee voters were required to give their ID number in the form of either their driver’s 
license or last four digits of their Social Security number.  
In addition to the new photo ID modifications, HB 589 similarly altered other 
traditional North Carolina voting practices. Early voting was reduced to 10 days and all 
voting sites within a county were required to be open at the same. This resulted in the 
customary first week of early voting being cut from polling locations across the state. Polling 
locations were also no longer required to remain open if they experienced problems or delays 
in voting. Furthermore, HB 589 barred same day registration and straight party voting. 
Voters who wished to vote in an upcoming election were required to register at least 25 days 
before election day. Potential voters aged 16 and 17 were also restricted from registering to 
vote; this included the elimination of registration drives in high school throughout the state.  
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North Carolina legislatures also put safeguards in HB 589 to protect certain segments 
of the electorate which were to take effect in January of 2014 (democracy North Carolina, 
2013). This included exceptions for elderly voters who have had their licenses revoked and 
the blind (Hawkins, 2015). Voters who claimed that did not have sufficient funds to obtain a 
proper form of identification were also allowed to sign a declaration asking to have fees 
waived from services like obtaining a birth or marriage certificate (Hawkins, 2015). Even 
though some segments of the electorate were protected under HB 589, there were scores of 
other voters who were adversely affected that were not protected under HB 589.  
One population that has been adversely affected by the new changes was black voters. 
Studies have shown that most black early voters cast their ballot in the first week of early 
voting (Herron and Smith, 2015). This is no longer possible since the first week of early 
voting was eliminated in HB 589. In 2012, 56 percent of ballots for the entire election were 
cast during early voting (Raymond, 2014). In both the 2008 and 2012 elections, black voters 
voted proportionally higher compared to all other voters within North Carolina’s electorate 
every single day of early voting (Herron and Smith, 2015). Blacks in North Carolina were 
also more likely to register to vote during early voting and in the days leading up to an 
election, including same day registration (Herron and Smith, 2015).   
Now that early voting is limited to only 10 days, instead of the original 17 days, 
potential black voters are now restricted in their access to vote during early voting 
(Raymond, 2014). Furthermore, new election laws requiring voters to register to vote at least 
25 days before an election do not allow these voters to register leading up to or the day of an 
election. By reducing the number of days for early voting and placing stricter requirements 
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on when people may register, HB 589 has not only limited the ability of black voters to cast 
their ballots, but the ability of all individuals with limited mobility and time.  
Not only is it difficult for black voters to be registered to vote and arrive at a polling 
location within a restricted time frame, black voters are also directly affected by the type of 
accepted identifications outlined in HB 589. According to Herron and Smith, in North 
Carolina, black voters are disproportionately less likely to possess two or more HB 589 
acceptable forms of identification (2015). In North Carolina, 23 percent of voters are black, 
yet black voters make up 34 percent of the electorate in North Carolina without an acceptable 
form of photo ID needed to vote (Raymond, 2014).  
Also not included in this new law was the acceptance of student university issued 
photo ID cards (Foley, 2016). By not accepting university issued photo ID cards, the North 
Carolina legislature indirectly potentially disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of 
postsecondary students attending the 125 colleges throughout the state (Turner, 2015). Prior 
to HB 589, students in North Carolina could use their university-issued photo ID to verify 
their identification when voting. This change eventually led to a group of college students 
filing a lawsuit that challenged the elimination of same day registration, the use of student 
photo IDs as an accepted means of voter ID, and the preregistration of 16-and-17-year-olds 
(Foley, 2016). This issues of this case will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter.  
In addition to the elimination of student photo IDs as an accepted form of 
identification, young voters have been both directly and indirectly affected by  other 
provisions and changes made to North Carolina’s elections in HB 589. Young voters were 
directly affected by their inability to register at the age of sixteen and seventeen when HB 
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589 eliminated teenage pre-registration. In addition to the elimination of teenage pre-
registration, HB 5589 removed Citizens Awareness Month, put in place by 2012 North 
Carolina Governor Bev Perdue, which intended to raise awareness of voter registration for 
North Carolina citizens.  
Making it difficult to vote for young voters is particularly troublesome due to their 
inexperience following correct voting procedures. Young voters’ inability to fully grasp a 
novice concept makes it indirectly difficult for young voters to properly cast their ballots, 
especially when election rules are changing frequently and drastically (Turner, 
2015).  Eventually, HB 589 could face a 26th Amendment challenge due to the law 
disproportionately affecting younger and college-age voters. In 1979, the Supreme Court 
ruled under the 26th Amendment college students have a right to vote in the community 
where they attend college (Turner, 2015). For some college students, especially those who 
live out of state, it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain an acceptable form of 
identification needed to vote in North Carolina elections. 
In 2015, after opposition to the new voter photo ID law, which was intended be 
implemented in January of 2016, HB 589 was amended by HB 836. The revision of HB 589 
resulted in the extent of the law changing from a strict photo ID law to a non-strict photo ID 
law. Now, voters who were not able to obtain a photo ID could declare their incapability 
through one of eight claims, including transportation, disability or illness, lost or stolen 
identification card, or lack of identifying documents (Hawkins, 2015). Still, regardless if 
individuals met one of these claims, they still might have to provide either a voter registration 
card or their Social Security number (Hawkins, 2015).  
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Hawkins (2015) claims that North Carolina amended HB 589 with HB 836 in an effort to 
avoid litigation over the original bill. Despite the 2015 amendment, HB 589 has continued to 
face countless lawsuits and has remained a topic of concern in both state and federal courts 
for the past four years. HB 589’s legal battles began on August 12, 2013, the same day 
Governor Pat McCrory signed HB 589 into law, in the case League of Women Voters of 
North Carolina, et al. v. North Carolina. The next chapter will review and analyze the 
complaint filed by the League of Women Voters of North Carolina (LWVNC), as well as two 
other complaints filed against HB 589 by the North Carolina National Association for the 




From the day HB 589 was signed into law, it has been a continuous topic of judicial 
controversy. When the bill was signed into law on August 12, 2013, it simultaneously 
became the subject of two lawsuits in the League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. 
v. Howard (2013) and in North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013). By September, a new 
complaint was filed against HB 589 by the United States Department of Justice in United 
States v. North Carolina (2013). Despite the slight difference in their complaints, each of 
these cases raised the issue of whether HB 589 violated the 14th and 15th Amendments and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Even though each of these cases are similar in their intent, it 
is important to examine them separately in order to understand the motives behind why each 
party challenged HB 589 so soon after its passage.  
League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2014) 
The first complaint filed against HB 589 was filed by the League of Women Voters 
of North Carolina (LWVNC). Since its founding in 1920 and in this case, the LWVNC, a 
nonpartisan organization, has claimed to protect the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 to make sure every level of the government is running successfully and 
impartially (League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). In addition to 
the LWVNC, there were three other organization plaintiffs involved in the case. The second 
organization plaintiff was the North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute (NC APRI). The 
NC APRI, a senior constituency group of the AFL-CIO, became a party in the case to 
advance racial equality and economic justice. NC APRI has also historically attempted to 
increase NC African Americans’ access to the polls by providing transportation and 
encouraging registration on election day, which would no longer be allowed under HB 589. 
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The third organization plaintiff was Unifour OneStop Collaborative, a nonprofit 
primarily focused in the Unifour Region of North Carolina, which has expanded to include 
31 counties throughout the state (League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard 
(2014)). The final organization plaintiff was Common Cause North Carolina (Common 
Cause NC), which is also a grassroots nonprofit like Unifour OneStop Collaborative. Though 
their involvement in this case, Common Cause NC hoped to expand early voting opportunity 
and reintroduce same-day registration (League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. 
Howard (2014)). Each of these plaintiffs claimed they had standing in this case because once 
enacted, VIVA would “directly impair the organizational plaintiffs’ mission of civic 
engagement” and the members of these organizations also have standing, which gives these 
organizations associational standing (League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard 
(2014)). In addition to the four organization plaintiffs, there were also five individual 
plaintiffs; Goldie Wells, Kay Brandon, Octavia Rainey, and Sara and Hugh Stohler (League 
of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). Each of these plaintiffs claimed they 
had standing because, under VIVA, their personal rights would be burdened and infringed 
upon. 
The first defendants listed on the complaint were five individual members, who acted 
in their official capacity as members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; Joshua 
Howard, Rhonda Amoroso, Joshua Malcom, Paul Foley, and Maja Kricker (League of 
Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). In addition to the five members of the 
North Carolina State Board of Elections, then-Governor Pat McCrory was also listed among 
the defendants in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North Carolina. The 
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plaintiffs began their complaint by alleging the defendants, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)).  
The plaintiffs claimed that HB 589 would violate the Constitution and laws of the 
United States and would unduly burden citizens and residents of North Carolina through 
discrimination caused by the Voter Information and Verification Act (VIVA).  The plaintiffs 
stated that VIVA would discriminate against North Carolinians through the implementation 
of provisions intended to eliminate same-day registration, reduce days for early voting, and 
the prohibition of provisional ballots for voters who vote out of their precinct (League of 
Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). The plaintiffs go on to discuss how 
each of these new provisions will negatively impact future elections, including making 
voting lines longer on Election Day.  
In addition to their broad claim that HB 589 will unduly burden North Carolina 
voters, the plaintiffs particularly highlight how the new provisions will especially 
discriminate against African American voters. The plaintiffs believed that African American 
voters would be especially affected by the effects of VIVA, which would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
(League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). To address the wrongs the 
plaintiffs claimed VIVA would warrant, they listed four claims for relief.  
Both the first and second claims for relief dealt with the denial of equal protection 
under the 14th Amendment. Under the first claim, per the plaintiffs, VIVA created a severe 
burden on an individual’s fundamental right to vote that was not narrowly tailored to advance 
a compelling state interest. The plaintiffs claimed that VIVA burdened voters by reducing the 
number of days allowed for early voting, eliminating same-day registration, and not allowing 
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provisional ballots to be counted for voters who voted out of their precinct (League of 
Women Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). Under their second claim, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the sole purpose of VIVA was to suppress turnout and electoral participation of 
African American voters, which would deny them equal protection (League of Women 
Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). 
Next, the third claim of relief stated that the plaintiffs’ rights had been violated under 
Section 2 of VRA of 1965 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The plaintiffs claimed that alterations made 
to voting through the reduction of early voting days, elimination of same-day registration, 
and not allowing provisional ballots to be counted for voters who voted out of their precinct 
disproportionately impact African-American voters because African-Americans are more 
likely to use these voting opportunities than another other racial group (League of Women 
Voters of North Carolina v. Howard (2014)). The fourth and final claim for relief deals 
particularly with Section 3(c) of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. This claim for 
relief supposes that once the court finds the defendants guilty of committing constitutional 
violations, they should retain jurisdiction and require pre-clearance for any future change in 
voting practices or procedures.  
Two-and-a-half years after the plaintiffs filled their complaint, the case went to trial 
on January 25, 2016. On March 25, the Middle District Court  of North Carolina ruled in 
favor of North Carolina. The opinion of the court upheld VIVA and North Carolina’s use of a 
voter ID requirement. Just twelve days after the opinion of the court was released, LWVNC, 
filed their notice of appeal and filed their brief thirteen days later. On July 29, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court. This led to the State of 
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North Carolina filing an application with the United State Supreme Court on October 2 
(Election Law @Moritz, 2016).  
On October 8, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the application and kept the mandate 
put in place by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit until a timely 
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed. Even though this was a temporary solution, this was 
a huge win for the LWVNC. The U.S. Supreme Court decision prevented the voter ID law to 
be effect for the upcoming 2014 election. On April 6, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court 
officially denied North Carolina’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  
North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013) 
 On August 12, 2013, the same day that LWVNC filed their complaint, so did the 
North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (North Carolina NAACP), as well as seven 
other individual plaintiffs, six of whom who filed under the name of either John or Jane Doe, 
in order to remain anonymous. The North Carolina NAACP sought to further their mission of 
advancement and improvement by filing to be a party in this case. Furthermore, the North 
Carolina NAACP filed to protect their members who would be directly impacted by the 
discriminatory provisions of HB 589. The North Carolina NAACP also had standing because 
particular provisions in HB 589 make it difficult for the organization to engage in their 
typical day-to-day activities and hinder their ability to fulfill their mission (North Carolina 
NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). The only individual listed on the complaint by name is 
Rosanell Eaton, a 92-year-old African American woman (North Carolina NAACP v. 
McCrory (2013)). 
 The complaint filed by the plaintiffs include a list of defendants that was identical to 
the list of defendants in the League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. Howard 
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(2013), except for the addition of Kim Westbrook Strach, the Executive Director of the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections. In their complaint, the plaintiffs attempted to protect and 
preserve North Carolinians’ voting rights by challenging the passage of HB 589, which 
imposes various burdens upon the electorate, particularly potential African-Americans 
voters. The complaint discusses in detail the ramifications of the decision made by the 
Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder, which chiefly invalidated Section 4(b) of the 
VRA (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). This is significant because the plaintiffs 
see the decision made in Shelby County v. Holder, a 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) as the primary 
reason why North Carolina was allowed to pass HB 589, which required no pre-clearance 
from the Department of Justice.  
 The complaint continues to North Carolina’s history of discriminatory voting 
practices and how this laid the groundwork for HB 589. Like the plaintiffs in League of 
Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2013), the plaintiffs in this case highlight 
provisions within HB 589 that will result in discriminatory voting practices, such as early 
voting, same-day registration, and, most importantly, modifications made to increase voter 
identification requirements (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). The most 
important modifications listed in the complaint include providing a particular form of ID in 
addition to a driver’s license number or last four digits of a social security number and 
limited the list of acceptable photo identifications, such as a North Carolina issued driver’s 
license, military ID, or a passport. These new provisions disproportionately impacted 
African-Americans, who were identified by the State Board of Elections as making up a large 
percentage of North Carolinians who did not have a NC driver’s license and/or another form 
of acceptable photo ID (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). 
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 In order to address the wrongs listed in their complaint, the plaintiffs listed three 
counts in their claims for relief. The first count listed a violation of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973). Like the plaintiffs in League of Women Voters of North 
Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2013), the plaintiffs in North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory 
(2013) claimed that Section 2 of the VRA was being violated because African-Americans 
were more likely to take advantage of provisions either limited or eliminated by HB 589; 
provisions which included early voting, same-day registration, and the use provisional ballots 
for voters who vote out of their precinct (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)).  
It is important that the complaint mentions that the North Carolina General Assembly 
knew at the time of HB 589’s enactment that the changes made to early voting, same-day 
registration, and provisional ballots for out of precinct voters are more likely to place a 
higher burden on African-Americans voters. The complaint also claims that the NC General 
Assembly also knew that African-Americans were less likely to have an acceptable form of 
photo ID (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). By making these claims, the 
plaintiffs assert that the enactment of HB 589 was intentional to disproportionately keep 
African-Americans from voting. 
 The second count asserts that HB 589 violates the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. Similar to an assertion made in Count One, the complaint mentions that the legislative 
history of HB 589 shows that race was an appealing factor when gaining support for the 
law’s enactment (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). Count Two also lists the 
either limited or eliminated provisions of early voting, same-day registration, and the use 
provisional ballots for voters who vote out of their precinct as proof of discrimination; 
however, in these claims, the complaint states that the provisions violate the Equal Protection 
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Clause of the 14th Amendment in addition to violating Section 2 of the VRA. Count Two also 
claims that the NC General Assembly knew this provision would disproportionately impact 
African-American voters and, therefore, violate their constitutional right of equal protection 
under the 14th Amendment. On the other hand, Count Two mentions that, even if the changed 
provisions serve a compelling or legitimate state interest, there is no way they outweigh the 
burdens they place on voters (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory (2013)). This statement is 
significant because it suggests that the rights of a voter should be considered when any part 
of government attempts to restrict individual rights.   
 The final count introduces a violation not seen in the League of Women Voters of 
North Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2013). Count Three states that HB 589 violates the 15th  
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to the three provisions used in the previous 
two counts, Count Three also states that African-Americans would be disproportionately 
impacted by a new provision in HB 589 that increases the number of individuals who can 
challenge ballots independently and collectively (North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory 
(2013)). The complaint states that the previous three provisions are in no way adequately 
tailored to support a legitimate or compelling state interest. Despite stating this claim, the 
plaintiffs make no further claims to support this assertion. According to this count, the 
plaintiffs believe that HB 589 is in violation of the 15th Amendment because it 
disproportionately denies citizens of the United States the right to vote because of their race 
and/or color. 
 On August 8, 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina filed its opinion and order denying motion for preliminary injunction and motion for 
summary judgment requested by the plaintiff. On October 16, the appellant, North Carolina 
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NAACP, filed their notice of appeal. By October 1, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion, which remanded the case to the District Court for a new 
trial. The Court of Appeals stated that the appellants needed to establish the balance of the 
burdens placed on African-American voters against the public’s interest in a new trial. On 
April 25, 2016, the District Court released its new opinion, which upheld the use of North 
Carolina’s voter ID law. Once again, the appellants, North Carolina NAACP, filed their 
notice of appeal on May 6, 2016 (Election Law @Moritz, 2016). 
On July 29, 2016, after the second appeal, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion. In 
the new opinion, the Court of Appeals temporarily enjoined the photo ID requirement and 
once again sent the case back to the District Court to determine if a permanent injunction was 
needed. On August 31, 2016, North Carolina filed for a stay of application, which was 
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. This was a huge victory for North Carolina NAACP, for 
the denial of the motion to stay prevented HB 589 from being in effect for the 2016 election. 
On December 27, 2016, North Carolina filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court. As of December 30, 2016, the case had been placed on the Supreme Court’s docket 
and distributed for conference on March 31, 2017 (Election Law @Moritz, 2016). 
United States v. North Carolina (2013) 
Almost 50 days after the HB 589 was signed into law and the LVVNC and North 
Carolina NAACP filed their complaints, the United State Department of Justice filed its own 
complaint on behalf of the United States of America against the state of North Carolina, the 
North Carolina State Board of Elections, and the Executive Director of the North Carolina 
State Board of Election, Kim Strach. Unlike the two previous plaintiffs, the Department of 
Justice did not include Governor McCrory in its list of defendants. According to Attorney 
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General Eric Holder, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 authorizes the Department of Justice to 
file a civil action to seek injunctive, preventive, and permanent reprieve for violating Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (United States v. North Carolina 
(2013)). 
The complaint then makes nine allegations against the state of North Carolina, all of 
which pertain to changing demographics among the state and its electorate. One key 
allegation was that blacks were three times less likely to have access to a vehicle compared to 
non-Hispanic whites, which would make it increasingly more difficult to obtain a proper 
form of identification in accordance with HB 589 (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). 
The list of allegations also included the claim that voter turnout among African-American 
voters in North Carolina was lower in the 2004 election, but exceeded the turnout of white 
voters in the 2008 and 2012 elections (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). Like the 
other complaints, the Department of Justice also discussed the history of voter discrimination 
in North Carolina, which subjected the state to pre-clearance from the Department of Justice 
before the state could change its election procedures and rules, prior to Shelby County v. 
Holder (2013) (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). 
Similar to the other complaints, the Department of Justice goes into detail discussing 
how HB 589 has affected the provisions of early voting, same-day registration, out-of-
precinct provisional ballots, and voter photo identification. The complaint also discusses the 
legislative history and enactment of HB 589 and how it has affected the perception of how 
the bill was enacted. This section often referred to the NC General Assembly awareness of 
the bills’ impact on African-Americans in North Carolina. Unlike other complaints, this 
section also discusses the impact HB 589 has had on the exclusion of student identification as 
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an acceptable form of voter photo ID in North Carolina. The exclusion of student photo ID 
card is irrational, according to the complaint, considering they were issued by public North 
Carolina institutions, which also included a few historically black universities (United States 
v. North Carolina (2013)). 
The Department of Justice continued their list of complaints by discussing how the 
implementation of HB 589 will have a discriminatory effect on North Carolina’s voters, 
especially African-Americans. Key statistics mentioned by the Department of Justice include 
that African-Americans used early voting more within the first seven days of early voting 
than any other race in the 2008 and 2012 elections. Under HB 589, the first seven days of 
early voting would be eliminated, which would have a discriminatory impact on African-
American voters in North Carolina. In North Carolina, black voters are also two times more 
likely to cast a provisional ballot out of their precinct than whites. Again, under HB 589, 
provisional ballots cast by voters out of their precinct would be eliminated. African-
American voters are also disproportionately less likely to have an acceptable form of 
identification and/or access to transportation to obtain an acceptable form of identification 
compared to white voters (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). 
In addition to discussing how the implementation of HB 589 will have a 
discriminatory effect on North Carolina’s voters, the Department of Justice also included a 
section in its complaint addressing its allegation that the passage of HB 589 was motivated 
by discriminatory purposes. The Department of Justice began its argument by addressing that 
eight years prior to HB 589, in 2005, North Carolina knew that, by not counting their out-of-
precinct provisional ballots, they would be disproportionately excluding African-American 
votes (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). The Department of Justice also claimed that 
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the North Carolina legislature enacted HB 589 while fully understanding North Carolina’s 
history of voter discrimination and socioeconomic impact bills such as HB 589 had on 
African-American voters (United States v. North Carolina (2013)). 
Furthermore, prior to the decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013), in April 2013, HB 589 had been dormant for months. Unsurprisingly, after Section 5 
of the VRA was declared invalid, HB 589 reentered the state senate and the voter photo ID 
provisions were made more extensive. Even the chairman of the Senate Rules Committee 
admitted that HB 589 was waiting to be reintroduced until a decision was made in Shelby 
County. The NC General Assembly even rejected amendments to HB 589 they knew would 
alleviate some of the problems for African-Americans voters in the state. In order to address 
these issues, the Department of Justice asked the courts for relief due to the absence of 3(c) 
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973a(c) (28), which gives the Attorney General the 
power to seek relief guaranteed by the 15th Amendment. According to the Department of 
Justice, if the court does not provide relief, then the state of North Carolina will continue to 
violate the Voting Rights Act and the 14th and 15th Amendments (United States v. North 
Carolina (2013)). 
Rather than appeal to the courts through a series of claims or counts, the Department 
of Justice issued a cause of action under Section 2 of the VRA. The Department of Justice’s 
cause of action reiterates its points made about the discriminatory effect the implementation 
of HB 589 would have on North Carolina voters and their allegation that the passage of HB 
589 was motivated by discriminatory purposes. In its final plea, it once again asked the 
courts to enjoin HB 589 by order of the court, stressing that North Carolina will continue to 
discriminate and violate the rights of its voters if they are not forcibility stopped. On August 
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8, 2014, the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina filed its 
order denying motion for preliminary injunction and motion for summary judgment. On May 
5, 2015, United States v. North Carolina (2013) was consolidated with League of Women 
Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2013) and North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory 
(2013). 
The three legal actions brought against the state of North Carolina and it various 
officials have continuously been remanded and appealed. Still, the final fate of HB 589 is 
unknown. The unanimous decision regarding the constitutionality of HB 589 will be 
discussed, in Chapter 5, as well as implications of this decision. Moreover, HB 589’s date 
with the Supreme Court will also be discussed and analyzed, including the order denying stay 




On May, 5, 2015, a motion was granted by the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of North Carolina to consolidate the three cases discussed in the previous chapter, for 
trial purposes: United States v. North Carolina (2013) was consolidated with League of 
Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. Howard (2013) and North Carolina NAACP v. 
McCrory, then to be referred to as North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick 
McCrory (2013). Almost three years after their complaints were filed, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion on July 29, 2016. Their opinion 
unanimously ruled in favor of the three appellee’s -- the League of Women Voters of North 
Carolina, the North Carolina NAACP, and the Department of Justice of the United States 
(North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016).  
The opinion begins with Judge Diana Motz ruling that the District Court erred when 
they failed to look at the big picture, which was the legislative intent behind HB 589 and, 
subsequently, the impact HB 589 would have on voters (North Carolina State Conference of 
NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016).  Like the complaints filed by each party, Judge Motz 
emphasized the discriminatory voting practices that have been historically present in North 
Carolina. Judge Motz continues by declaring that many areas within North Carolina are 
racially polarized, which was  defined in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) as “the race of voters 
correlates with the selection of certain candidate or candidates” (North Carolina State 
Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016; 9).  Per Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), 
polarized voting occurs when the selection of a particular candidate or candidates is a product 
of a certain pool of voters who happen to be the same race. Judge Motz uses the precedent in 
Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) to clarify that it is discriminatory to target minority voters in 
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polarized voting districts. The limited number of acceptable photo IDs, set by HB 589, would 
particularly affect African Americans, who are customarily members of polarized voting 
districts. By indirectly disenfranchising voters who are members of a polarized district, HB 
589 would inadvertently benefit a particular party, while disadvantaging all other parties 
(North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016).    
After discussing the failure of the District Court to look at the big picture, Judge Motz 
continued her opinion by addressing the impact the decision Shelby County v. Holder (2013) 
had on the court’s decision. Within this section of the opinion, Judge Motz delicately 
discussed the mad dash of state legislatures, from a certain party she does not name, which 
quickly enacted omnibus election laws after the decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013) 
was issued. Even though Judge Motz expressly stated in her opinion that this unnamed party 
“rarely enjoyed African American support,” she does not directly refer to this party as the 
Republican Party -- the party which clearly dominated state legislatures after gaining a 
substantial number of seats in both the federal and state governments following the 2010 
mid-term elections (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016).  
Judge Motz claimed that the pairing of the Shelby County v. Holder (2013) decision 
and the release of data requested by the North Carolina General Assembly regarding voting 
practices by race were a lethal combination that resulted in the creation of HB 589. Within 
the report requested by the North Carolina General Assembly the data showed different 
methods for voting that were primarily used by African Americans; five of which were 
restricted by HB 589 (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 
2016). To support her finding that the passage of HB 589 was clearly an intentional 
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discriminatory act, Judge Motz cited the League of United States Latin American Citizens v. 
Perry (LULAC) (2006) as precedent.  
According to Perry, if the state attempts to disenfranchise voters by restricting their 
primary methods of voting, but does not expressly state its intention, this act is still 
considered intentionally discriminatory. The opinion then continues to list examples of how 
the North Carolina General Assembly used its findings from the report to disenfranchise 
minority voters. First, Judge Motz discusses that, according to the report, black voters are 
indeed more likely to take advantage of early voting; as a result, the North Carolina General 
Assembly restricted the number days for early voting (North Carolina State Conference of 
NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016). North Carolina also denied same-day-registration and 
provisional ballots, which, according to the report, are also common voting methods utilized 
by black voters.  
Judge Motz’s ruling also stated that the North Carolina General Assembly 
intentionally restricted alternative photo IDs typically used by African Americans in favor of 
IDs typically used by white North Carolinians (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP 
v. Patrick McCrory, 2016). This statement by Judge Motz holds that the North Carolina 
General Assembly undoubtedly violated the 15th Amendment. By only allowing IDs more 
commonly possessed by white voters, while simultaneously restricting IDs used by blacks, 
North Carolina denied black and other minority voters, who are also citizens of the United 
States, the right to vote because of their race and color.  
In Section IV of the opinion, Judge Motz visits the North Carolina General 
Assembly’s claim that the use of photo ID when voting helps prevent voter fraud. The North 
Carolina General Assembly rightly relied on the ruling in Crawford v. Marion County 
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Election Board (2008), which held that photo IDs were justified in a state’s effort to prevent 
voter fraud. On the other hand, while agreeing with the precedent in Crawford, Judge Motz 
wrote that the attacks against voter IDs in Crawford was a facial attack and did not involve 
racial discrimination (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 
2016). This means that the precedent set in Crawford does not apply to the present case.   
The General Assembly’s cry for prevention of voter fraud is invalid due to the 
racially discriminatory application of HB 589 present in this case. Furthermore, Judge Motz 
also held that the photo ID requirement in HB 589 is simultaneously too broad and too 
narrow to prevent voter fraud. The requirement is too narrow because it requires photo ID for 
in-person voting, but not for absentee ballots. The requirement is too broad because the 
voting restrictions proposed in HB 589 in no way related to the North Carolina General 
Assembly’s attempt to prevent voter fraud (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. 
Patrick McCrory, 2016). 
Regarding the disagreement in Part V, Section B, it is first important to discuss Part 
V, Section A. In Section A, the court recognized its authority to invalidate laws when they 
are written and passed with the intent to discriminate; the court claimed they are awarded this 
power from Hunter v. Underwood (1985) and Anderson v. Russell (2001). The court also 
found authority for the power to sever only part of a law if it is unconstitutional, in Leavitt v. 
Jane L. (1966) (North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory, 2016). 
Since HB 589 was an omnibus bill that contained more than just the changing of voting 
provisions, the court has the power to strike just the voting provision from HB 589, while 
keeping the rest of the bill intact, which is exactly what it did.  
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Subsequently, in Part V, Section B, the court addresses the appropriate remedy for the 
challenged provisions stuck down in HB 589. In Part V, Section B, Judge James Wynn and 
Judge Henry Floyd concurred that the invalidation of each challenged provision was an 
acceptable remedy. Additionally, Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd discussed whether or not to 
remand the case to the District Court, so the lower court could decide if the reasonable 
impediment exception made the injunction of the challenged provisions unnecessary (North 
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory. 2016). Ultimately, the court 
decided to not remand the case due to the need to alleviate the impending burden on African 
American voters in North Carolina. 
Meanwhile, in a dissent to Part V, Section B, Judge Motz wrote that, under Kohl v. 
Woodhaven Learning Center (1989), a change in the circumstances surrounding the 
unconstitutional nature of a law or provision can destroy the need for an injunction. 
According to Judge Motz, the North Carolina General Assembly’s significant change to HB 
589 in 2015 constituted a change that could dismiss the need for an injunction in the case. 
Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd believed that the reasonable impediment exception did not 
fully remedy the impact of the questioned provision and there was no need for the case to be 
remanded. Judge Motz wrote that it is impossible to yet assess whether the amendment made 
in 2015 cures the unconstitutional provisions in the original bill (North Carolina State 
Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory. 2016). To address this confusion, Judge Motz 
suggested remanding the case and issuing a temporary injunction until the District Court 
decided whether a temporary or permanent injunction is needed. 
Ultimately, the panel of judges unanimously ruled that the challenged provisions of 
HB 589 were unconstitutional. Thus, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed and the 
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case was remanded to the District Court to prevent the implementation of HB 589 changes to 
early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and pre-registration. Following 
the decision in North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick McCrory (2016), 
voters in North Carolina were no longer required to present a photo ID when voting in the 
2016 election. The outcome of this ruling could have the ability to impact voter laws in other 
states as well. The precedent set by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could spark similar 
legal battles in states that have similar voting laws as HB 589. 
For now, the opinion issued by Judge Motz and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit is considered a success for voting rights advocates. On December 27, 2016, 
the state of North Carolina filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
asking the justices to hear their appeal (@ Moritz, 2017). So far, there have been two briefs 
of amicus curiae filed against the state of North Carolina and HB 589. The first was filed by 
Judicial Watch, Inc. and the Allied Educational Foundation on January 26, 2017 (@ Moritz, 
2017).  The second brief was filed by the Public Interest Legal Foundation on January 30, 
2017. As of April 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet granted or denied North 




The main purpose of this thesis was to evaluate North Carolina’s voter identification 
statutes and the numerous challenges they have faced in federal court. The complaints filed 
against HB 589, regarding its supposed unconstitutional voting provisions, mirror historical 
objections filed against the unconstitutional use of poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and 
literacy tests. Each of these voting practices was challenged and all of these provisions were 
declared unconstitutional by either the courts or by an amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  
Conversely, unlike the three previous anti-voting practices, HB 589’s voting 
provisions have not yet been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. This means that the 
voting provisions ruled unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could be 
reversed. If the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is overruled, the way in 
which Americans vote would once again begin to emulate the corrupt and discriminatory 
practices used by politicians in the past. Despite the passage of the 15th Amendment, aimed at 
protecting the right to vote for all United States citizens no matter their race, voting 
provisions, like those in HB 589, would attempt to maneuver their way around the 15th 
Amendment protection, just as Jim Crow laws did beginning in the 1870s (Ewald, 2009).  
The attempt to bypass the 15th Amendment through the use of voter ID laws became 
evident when South Carolina passed the first voter ID law in the country in 1950 (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2016). After Jim Crow laws, including the historical 
provisions used to disenfranchise certain voters, were declared void by the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, other states began to intact their own voter ID laws, hoping to disenfranchise 
specific populations. By the 2000s, 14 states had already adopted their own variations of 
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voter ID laws. This number continued to increase after the passage of the Help Americans 
Vote Act in 2002 (Alvarez et al., 2007). By May of 2016, there were over 30 states 
attempting to either adopt new voter ID laws or amend voter ID laws already had in place 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2016). 
This trend eventually made its way to North Carolina, when the North Carolina 
House of Representatives voted to pass HB 589 / S.L. 2013-381, also known as the Voter 
Information Verification Act (VIVA), by a vote of 73-42 on July 25, 2013. The passage of 
this bill was seen as a success by the Republican party, which had failed to pass a similar bill 
two years earlier, after then Democratic Governor Bev Perdue vetoed the proposed 
legislation (Raymond, 2014). HB 589 made provisions to reduce the number of day for early 
voting, restrict the number of accepted forms of photo ID, and eliminate same-day 
registration and the use of provisional ballots for voters who voted outside of their own 
precinct (Herron & Smith, 2015). These changes are what eventually led to two complaints 
filed against HB 589 by the League of Women Voters of North Carolina and the North 
Carolina NAACP on the same day HB 589 was signed into law by Governor Pat McCrory on 
August 12, 2013. HB 589 also faced another complaint on September 30, 2013 by the United 
States Department of Justice against the state of North Carolina. 
 Each of the three complaints brought against Governor Pat McCrory, the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections, and the state of North Carolina discussed the 
discriminatory impact the new voting provisions within HB 589 would have on the voters of 
North Carolina.  Each of the complaints focused particularly on how the alteration of the 
aforementioned provisions would have an overwhelmingly discriminatory effect on black 
voters, which is a violation of the 14th and the 15th Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights 
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Act of 1965. On May 5, 2015, on the second appeal, the three cases against Governor Pat 
McCrory, the North Carolina State Board of Elections, and the state of North Carolina were 
granted consolidation by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. 
On July 29, 2016, after almost three years of litigation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion, declaring the voting provisions in HB 589 unconstitutional.  
Despite achieving this victory, North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Patrick 
McCrory (2016) still has a chance of being granted certiorari and the opinion of the Fourth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals could be reversed. Amicus curiae briefs continue to be filed, the 
state of North Carolina continues to reply, and there has been a conditional motion to add the 
North Carolina General Assembly as an additional petitioner as of March 9, 2017 (Election 
Law @ Moritz, 2017). Nonetheless, as of late April of 2017, the decision of the Fourth 
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